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Chapter 5 
Hizballah and the Logic of Political 
Participation 
JEROEN GUNNING 
This chapter focuses on the development of the Shi'i Islamist movement 
Hizballah from its inception in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon until the present. Hizballah is undergoing a transformation from 
a radical, absolutist resistance movement to an increasingly accommoda- 
tionist political organization. To explain this transformation, what follows 
charts the origins of the movement, and explores how changes in the com- 
position of its support base, the Lebanese political system, and regional 
conditions have affected its goals and behavior. Particular attention is paid 
to the effects of Hizballah's inclusion into the political system of postwar 
Lebanon, and to the impact of Israeli policy on Hizballah's evolution. 
Among other factors, including changes in the foreign policies of Iran and 
Syria and the attainment of a limited balance of power between Hizballah 
and the Israeli army, it is maintained that inclusion into the political system 
has had a moderating effect on Hizballah's domestic goals and methods 
and to a lesser extent its resistance operations. It has not dimmed the lead- 
ership's opposition to Israel, or its support for the Palestinian resistance, 
including its controversial tactic of targeting civilians, but participation in 
the political system has introduced a logic of electoral accountability that 
has made escalatory resistance operations more costly. 
Hizballah emerged in direct response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 
1982 and for much of the 1980s, its main activity consisted of resistance- 
including the then locally innovative tactics of suicide bombing and hos- 
tage-taking (although the precise extent of its involvement in the latter is 
disputed). It called for an Islamic revolution and an Islamic state in Leba- 
non, under the aegis of the Islamic Republic of Iran and modeled on Aya- 
tollah Khomeini's urilavat al-faqih (rule of the supreme jurisprudent). To 
realize such a state, Lebanon had to be freed from Israeli occupation. But 
it also had to be "liberated" from its secular. sectarian structures and shed 
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its imperialist roots as an "artificial" Christian-dominated client state. ' 
From its inception, Hizballah refused to accept the legitimacy of the Leba- 
nese state, or its rigid sectarian system of allocating political quotas to each 
of the religious communities ('corporate consociation'). Lebanon was to 
be abolished and subsumed under the soon-to-be liberated areas of the 
Middle East-starting with Iraq, which, in Hizballah's eyes, was at that time 
in the process of being freed by Iran from its U. S. -sponsored secular 
regime. Hizballah was messianic on foundation, infused with an optimism 
created by the Iranian revolution and its own early successes against the 
Israelis and the multinational force stationed in Lebanon. 2 
Although Hizballah still proclaims theoretical allegiance to the notion of 
an Islamic state, in practice it has abandoned calls for its establishment in 
Lebanon. Instead, it advocates the return of "humanitarian" values such 
as integrity, accountability, and noncorruptibility to public life and for the 
discriminatory practice of political sectarianism to be replaced with a merit- 
ocratic democracy. Calls for the abolition of the Lebanese state have been 
replaced with impassioned defenses of Lebanon's territorial integrity, its 
national interest, and the right of all its citizens, including Christians, to 
return. The party's campaign themes have become largely secular, focused 
on Lebanese concerns, and devoid of messianic content. ` 
At a practical level, Hizballah has expanded from an underground mili- 
tia to a political party with a highly efficient apparatus, an extensive welfare 
network and a small semi-professional resistance organization. Its resis- 
tance activities have become circumscribed by rules of engagement agreed 
upon indirectly with the Israeli armed forces. Though Israel's withdrawal 
from Lebanon in May 2000 has not caused Hizballah to cease operations, 
it has limited its activities largely to a small disputed border area called the 
Shebaa Farms and carefully calibrated them so as not to escalate the con- 
flict. It has by and large accepted the sovereignty of Lebanon's coercive 
apparatuses, the police and the army, and only challenges this sovereignty 
in its insistence on the right to resist. It has entered the political system and 
repeatedly won around 8 percent of Parliamentary seats, constituting the 
largest opposition party bloc. It has been one of the most successful parties 
in the municipal elections. " The composition of its constituency has 
changed to include secular supporters, while the profile of its top leader- 
ship has changed from predominantly clerical to a mixture of clerics and 
professionals. It has reached out to Christians and entered into alliances 
with both Christian and Sunni politicians. 
To explain Hizballah's evolution from a radical, absolutist underground 
resistance to an increasingly accommodationist political party with a resis- 
tance agenda, I will take a closer look at the origins of Hizballah-the rea- 
sons behind its emergence, the profile of its support base, its ideology, its 
political culture, and the power resources at its disposal. Having explored 
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the factors that can be seen to drive the organization's goals and methods, 
I will then examine how these factors have changed. 
Origins of Hizballah 
Hizballah emerged out of three converging phenomena: the 1970s politi- 
cal revival among Lebanon's Shi'a; the Islamist euphoria created by the 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran; and the resistance to Israel's 1982 invasion 
of Lebanon. 
Marginalized socially and politically, ' Lebanon's Shi'a were galvanized 
into action by a number of separate events. Modernization and the onset of 
civil war in 1975 had begun to undermine the authority of the Shi'i notable 
families and led to an expansion of the proportion of Shi'a available for 
political mobilization. ' Socioeconomic changes created both a new 
counter-elite and an impoverished underclass within the Shi'i community. 
Increased proximity, as a result of urbanization, highlighted the discrep- 
ancy between the status of the Shi'a and that of the other religious commu- 
nities, reinforcing their sense of communal injustice. 
Politically, these changes found expression in two movements: one ema- 
nating from the Shi'i clergy as they were shedding their traditional political 
quietism, the other from the various left-wing political movements emerg- 
ing regionwide. This second trend, represented by Lebanese parties such 
as the Communist Party and the numerous Palestinian militias of the PLO 
that had descended on Lebanon following their ousting from Jordan in 
1970, played a secondary role in the emergence of Hizballah by serving as 
a catalyst for political mobilization among the Shi'a. ' 
The religiously inspired trend-out of which Hizballah emerged-was 
dominated by two social movements: the Movement of the Disinherited 
and the Lebanese Islamic Da'wa Party, a branch of the regionwide Da'wa 
Party which had its headquarters in Najaf, Iraq. The first was established in 
the 1970s by Imam Musa al-Sadr, son of a prominent religious leader. Its 
goal was to counter the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Shi'i political 
elite and to improve the social and political position of Lebanon's Shia. It 
did not question the legitimacy of the Lebanese state or its multiconfes- 
sional nature, but sought to change the inter-confessional balance of 
power. Following the outbreak of civil war in 1975, the movement estab- 
lished a political party and militia called Amal. Dwarfed initially by the 
multiconfessional militias to which the majority of Shi'a were drawn, Amal 
expanded exponentially after 1978. " 
During the 1970s, Amal attracted both religiously minded and secular 
Shi'a. Following Sadr's disappearance in 1978, the party began to abandon 
its religious roots and, under the leadership of lawyer Nabih Berri, became 
increasingly secular, creating a dilemma for its religiously minded support- 
ers. The process leading up to Berri's 1983 decision to join the National 
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Reconciliation Committee (the de facto national government of the day) 
without demanding significant reforms was for those already disenchanted 
with his secular direction the final straw. Hussain al-Musawi, one of the co- 
founders of Hizballah, is a good illustration of this trend. Vice president of 
Amal until 1982, he was ousted following a dispute with Berri over Amal's 
direction and formed "Islamic Amalone of the organizations to 
coalesce under the umbrella of Hizballah. Each of Hizballah's three secre- 
taries general was similarly once a member of Amal. "' 
The Lebanese Da'wa Party, and its affiliate the Lebanese Association of 
Muslim Students, was closely linked to Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlal- 
lah, the son of an Ayatollah from South Lebanon and well known across 
the Shi'i community for his charisma and erudition. Inspired by Da'wa 
founder Sayyed Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, Fadlallah believed that (Shi'i) 
Islam contained the solution to the region's problems and advocated the 
creation of a society based on Islamic principles. In contrast to Amal, Fad- 
lallah and his followers questioned the very legitimacy of the Lebanese 
state. Theirs was a regional vision, based on affiliation to Islam. 
Fadlallah was one of the main forces behind the growth of the Lebanese 
Da'wa Party. But similarly significant was the steady expulsion of Lebanese 
clerics studying in Najaf under the increasingly anti-Shi'a Iraqi Bath 
regime, culminating in the deportation of more than a hundred in 1977. 
Having studied under Da'wa founder Baqr al-Sadr, many gravitated toward 
the Lebanese Da'wa Party and established hawzats (Shi'i religious acade- 
mies) which propagated al-Sadr's philosophy. Initially concentrating their 
activities in the social and spiritual realms, Da'wa supporters became pro- 
gressively politicized, spurred on by the successes of Amal and the Commu- 
nist Party, the socioeconomic changes that drove these trends, the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, and the Israeli invasion of 1982. " 
The Iranian revolution galvanized both Amal and the Da'wa Party, serv- 
ing as an inspiration for religiously inspired political activism, and making 
available new financial and political opportunities for specifically Shi'i par- 
ties. It sealed the shift from quietism to activism among the Shia region- 
wide. And it brought to power a regime that was both self-consciously 
seeking closer links with Shi'i communities elsewhere and had a particular 
interest in countering Israeli influence in the region, regarded as the local 
face of American imperialism. Lebanon thus became an important focus 
of Iranian foreign policy. 
The Israeli invasion of 1982 both provoked resistance among the Shia, 
who suffered disproportionately, and annihilated the Palestinian militias- 
the invasion's objective-leaving a power vacuum. It precipitated Iran's 
sending a contingent of Revolutionary Guards. And it helped resolve the 
tension Da'wa supporters experienced between rejection of the system and 
the desire to affect political change, by providing a political focus away from 
the debate surrounding the legitimacy of the Lebanese state, and by final- 
Hizballah 161 
izing the enclavization of Lebanon-thereby enabling dreams of establish- 
ing an Islamic order within the enclaves where activists were dominant. 12 
The 1982 invasion also encouraged the Syrian regime to cultivate a new 
proxy resistance force. The Syrian army had been in Lebanon since Syria's 
1976 intervention yet it sought to avoid engaging the Israeli army directly. 
Amal, Syria's long-time ally, had initially sided with the Israelis because of 
its own struggle against the Palestinian militias, leaving Syria without a 
proxy to counter the Israeli occupation. The various religiously motivated 
groups that were to become Hizballah were ideal candidates because of 
their zeal, their roots in local society and their access to an external state 
sponsor, Iran, which would field the expenses. 13 
Hizballah stepped into the vacuum created by these various trends. It 
replaced the Palestinian militias as a dedicated resistance force. It replaced 
Amal as Iran's, and briefly Syria's, favored Shi'i party and as the new cham- 
pion of religiously inspired Shia, whose number had grown since the Ira- 
nian revolution. At the same time, the seeds were laid for Hizballah to take 
up Amal's mantle of championing the marginalized-secular as well as reli- 
giously oriented-as Amal became increasingly absorbed into the elite pact 
governing the country. 
Hizballah's early goals and behavior can be explained in part by the pro- 
file of its support base and the political climate it emerged from. The bulk 
of Hizballah's activists came from the ranks of the Da'wa Party and from 
among the more religiously inclined of the secularized Amal movement. 
Some switched from the Communist Party or the leftist Palestinian militias, 
disillusioned by their ineffectiveness in confronting the invasion or 
inspired by the Iranian revolution to rethink their secular orientation. The 
majority of Hizballah's leaders and supporters were not members of the 
traditional elite families. Most of its members came from lower- to lower- 
middle-class backgrounds, " and while an increasingly significant number 
of these were university graduates or people with professional aspirations, ' 
few belonged to the nouveau riche class that Amal had come to represent. ', ' 
The less reason Hizballah's members had to be loyal to the existing sys- 
tem, the more attractive Iran's radically different system became. Amal's 
cooption into the political system confirmed their belief that only a full- 
scale revolution would end Shi'i marginalization within the Lebanese sys- 
tem. The Iranian model of self-consciously Shi'i activism was particularly 
attractive because it claimed to be a global movement ushering in a new 
age of justice. Thus, not only did membership of Hizballah transform a 
marginalized, local youth into a partner in a global revolution, but it also 
translated the local humiliations of Israeli occupation into symbols of 
global imperialism and offered a means of becoming part of a global jihad 
against American-Israeli imperialism. '' 
The fact that Hizballah consisted largely of a network of clerics and their 
followers, and had emerged in opposition to an increasingly secular Amal, 
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partly explains the particular attraction of Khomeini's rule of the jurists. 
For the clerics, Khomeini's system offered either the prospect of political 
power or the comfort that power would be in the hands of fellow clerics. 
For their followers, the rule of the jurists offered the prospect of access to 
power. For both, Khomeiniism was a way to distance themselves from Amal. 
Hizballah's early radicalism was in part a function of the situation in 
which it arose. It emerged in the aftermath of a bloody invasion, which 
according to one estimate caused 19,000 deaths, 32,000 casualties and dam- 
age to 80 percent of villages in the south. '" The increasingly brutal nature 
of the ensuing occupation consolidated the initial sense of outrage. 
Because Hizballah was conceived in the midst of Lebanon's brutal civil war, 
its methods reflected the prevailing violent climate-although Hizballah 
typically limited its violence to Israelis and Shi'i rivals, while refraining 
from targeting other religious communities in the conflict. The presence 
of Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the support Hizballah received from 
the hard-liners in the Iranian regime ensured that the hard-liners within 
Hizballah prevailed. It is thus not surprising that Hizballah's initial 
approach was one fueled by utopian and uncompromising radicalism and 
that its methods were those made popular by the violent practices of the 
civil war. 
Transforming Influences 
To understand Hizballah's transformation, it is necessary to analyze the 
changing nature of Hizballah's three main sources of power: local popular 
support, Iranian sponsorship and Syrian patronage. Hizballah's initial 
goals can be shown to be at least in part a reflection of the nature of these 
different sources and the prevailing political climate at the time, so 
changes in the political environment and its sources of power are likely to 
affect the organization's direction. A fourth factor concerns Israeli policies 
toward Hizballah, which have affected both the establishment and the evo- 
lution of the organization profoundly. I will discuss these separately. 
Though Iran was instrumental in creating Hizballah and has been one 
of its main sponsors, Iran's influence has diminished. If intelligence esti- 
mates are to be believed, not only have Iran's financial contributions 
dropped to but a third of Hizballah's overall estimated income but also 
Hizballah's power has come to rest increasingly on the popular and finan- 
cial support it enjoys within Lebanon and the Lebanese diaspora, and the 
backing of the Syrian government. '' Consequently, Hizballah has become 
less dependent on Iranian support for its survival. In addition, after the 
death of Khomeini, Iranian support for Hizballah's initial, radical goals 
became more muted. Moderates came to circumscribe the power of the 
hard-liners, particularly in the Foreign Office (at least until the Ahmadi- 
nejad election). Iran's relations with the Lebanese state also improved, par- 
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ticularly since the end of the civil war. 2° Though the foreign policy goals of 
Iranian hard-liners and moderates differ, both have abandoned the active 
pursuit of spreading the Islamic revolution-which is one reason why Hiz- 
ballah has ceased calling for an Islamic state in Lebanon. ''' Iran's support 
for the resistance has also become somewhat more muted. While Iran still 
encourages Hizballah's hostility toward Israel and continues to arm Hizbal- 
lah's resistance wing, it has no interest in provoking a full-scale confronta- 
tion with Israel. The pressure exerted by Iran on Hizballah to cease 
shelling northern Israel in an attempt to prevent another Israeli invasion 
in 1992 illustrates the point 2-as did the intervention of Iran's foreign 
minister in April 2002, urging Hizballah to end its worst confrontation with 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) since the latter's withdrawal from Leba- 
non in 2000.23 The fact that Iranian relations with the Palestinian resistance 
have improved since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 also 
means that Iran has less need of a "second front" in Lebanon to maintain 
its influence in the Levant and keep pressure on Israel-although this 
development has increased the incentive for Hizballah to become directly, 
if covertly, involved in the Palestinian resistance. 
Hizballah's capacity to continue functioning as a resistance movement 
remains largely dependent on Syrian acquiescence-even after Syria's with- 
drawal. Syrian support for the resistance is circumscribed by realpolitik. It 
can no longer count on the support of the Soviet Union, a fact that has 
affected the state of its army and made it more dependent on international 
investment. Its hegemonic position in Lebanon until 2005 had been partly 
dependent on Western acquiescence. At the same time, Syria continues to 
need a proxy resistance force-both to keep pressure on Israel to return 
the Golan Heights and because it has built its ideological identity on resist- 
ing Israel. In the absence of economic development and political liberaliza- 
tion, the Syrian regime is likely to continue to rely on resistance as a 
legitimizing tool. 
Syria's support for Hizballah's resistance activities comes at the price of 
restrictions in the political realm. Until recently, Hizballah has been pre- 
vented by the Syrian government from capitalizing electorally on its mili- 
tary successes, in line with Syria's policy of divide and rule. In each national 
election, Hizballah has sought to forge an alliance in opposition to Amal. 
On each occasion, the party was forced into an alliance with Amal to pre- 
vent Hizballah from usurping Amal's political position. As Hizballah's sup- 
port base has expanded since its entry into politics in 1992, Syrian control 
over Hizballah has weakened. Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon has further 
diluted Syria's ability to control Hizballah. But Syria can still restrict Hizbal- 
lah's ambitions and influence its future direction. Hizballah's decision to 
ally itself to Amal in the June 2005 elections-even after Syria's with- 
drawal-may partly be indicative of this influence (even though the logic 
behind the alliance was largely informed by the need to maintain a united 
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Shi'i front in the face of a strong Christian anti-Syrian coalition and an 
upsurge in calls for Hizballah's disarmament, both locally and internation- 
ally). 
Locally, Hizballah's relationship with its support base has changed with 
its expansion from a small underground militia to a political organization 
encompassing a political party, an extensive welfare network and a semi- 
professional resistance wing. Where once its popularity depended solely on 
its military prowess, it now depends on the performance of all three wings 
of its organization. 
Hizballah's resistance force is of limited significance in "military" terms. 
Though strong enough to oust Amal from Beirut's southern suburbs dur- 
ing the civil war and to affect the IDF's withdrawal in 2000, it fails to match 
the separate or combined strength of the Lebanese and (until recently) 
Syrian armed forces present in Lebanon. By the late 1990s, Hizballah's 
resistance arm was estimated at 300-500 experienced fighters and a body 
of up to 3,000 "reservists. " By contrast, the Lebanese and resident Syrian 
forces numbered 53,300 and 25,000-35,000 respectively in 1999.24 Not only 
do these armies dwarf Hizballah's erstwhile opponent, the IDF, which only 
had around 1,500 soldiers in Lebanon during the 1990s, but the skills Hiz- 
ballah developed in this struggle are of little use against either the Syrian 
or the Lebanese army. The Syrians lack the democratic constraints placed 
on the Israeli forces (as illustrated by the bloody 1982 massacre inflicted 
2.5 upon the insurgents of Hama) while attacking fellow Lebanese, includ- 
ing Shi'i co-nationals, would greatly undermine Hizballah's political 
standing. 
Hizballah's resistance wing has proven invaluable for gaining political 
legitimacy and continues to be of central importance to the party's self- 
image. Hizballah has gained in political standing from its early successes in 
driving the IDF from Beirut, through to winning the right to remain armed 
when all other militias were disarmed at the end of the civil war and its role 
in contributing to the chaotic withdrawal of the IDF in 2000. Its parliamen- 
tary candidates have consistently run on a "resistance ticket, " calling them- 
selves the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, asking voters to repay the sacrifice 
of martyrs with their vote. To the Shi'a, Hizballah's resistance success is par- 
ticularly empowering. But because of Hizballah's attempts to represent the 
resistance as Lebanese and because of Israel's heavy-handed policies, Hiz- 
ballah's continued commitment to the resistance has gained it respect 
beyond its Shi'i constituency. 
In the context of the "war on terror, " the presence of foreign forces in 
Iraq, and the continuation of hostilities in neighboring Israel/Palestine, 
resistance is likely to continue to play an important part in Hizballah's rhet- 
oric. Hizballah's victory in the 2005 national elections has indeed been 
interpreted by Hizballah's leadership as an endorsement of its resistance 
agenda . ''2 However, rhetoric notwithstanding, the actual activities of the 
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resistance, when compared to Hizballah's welfare and political efforts, have 
become increasingly significant in terms of their impact on Hizballah's 
political clout only, rather than in and of themselves. 
Hizballah's welfare services have become an important source of popu- 
larity because of their extensiveness, their efficiency and their reputation 
for integrity. Where the state or Amal fail to deliver basic services, Hizbal- 
lah steps in-whether it is a Christian village in the Bekaa valley cut off by 
an avalanche, or impoverished Shia in Beirut lacking water, electricity and 
sewerage services. NA'elfare activities are only indirectly translated into polit- 
ical capital, because those benefiting from the services do not necessarily 
support Hizballah. However, there is no doubt Hizballah benefits politi- 
cally from its charitable investments. Almost from its inception, Hizballah 
has employed charities to offset the negative effects of Israeli offensives, 
partly from a sense of civic duty, inspired by Islam and a long clerical tradi- 
tion of charitable activity among Shia, and partly to gain sufficient credit 
among the population to continue its resistance efforts. One of the reasons 
Hizballah has recently invested heavily in the south has been to counter 
the influence Amal has through its control over the government's recon- 
struction fund for the South. The services Hizballah provides in the south- 
ern suburbs of Beirut similarly seek to outperform Amal, not only among 
the Shia who are registered to vote in Beirut, but also among the many 
displaced residents who are still registered, and thus vote, in the South. 
Funding for these activities comes from religious and charitable dona- 
tions from allied states-in particular Iran which, especially in the early 
stages, funded most of Hizballah's charities`'-and from individuals, both 
from inside Lebanon and from the Lebanese diaspora and Iranians with 
Lebanese links. The process of fundraising, whether for the resistance or 
for Hizballah's welfare institutions, plays an important role in the political 
mobilization of the community. Local fundraising is carried out with the 
help of small colored metal boxes on poles in strategic places throughout 
the urban landscape, or by volunteers standing with boxes and flags by the 
roadside. Though funds are being raised for particular charities associated 
with Hizballah, Hizballah benefits politically from the "brand" recogni- 
tion. 
The expansion of Hizballah's welfare services has introduced a conserva- 
tism that militates against radical resistance activities. The extensive invest- 
ments Hizballah has made in the South, for instance, render Israeli 
retaliatory strikes more costly. The growth of those involved in charitable 
activities within Hizballah has expanded the constituency of those more 
interested in institution building and networking than in resistance per se. 
The movement's decision to expand its investments in areas most likely to 
be hit by Israeli strikes suggests that Hizballah as a whole has become more 
interested in, and reconciled to, a post-resistance phase-suggesting its 
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adherence to the goal of eradicating Israel may be tempered by pragmatic 
considerations. 
The creation of a political party organization, finally, has done more 
than anything to change the relationship between Hizballah and its sup- 
port base. That it was established at all was to a large extent a function of 
the ending of the civil war, the opening up of an autonomous political 
space and the Lebanese state's willingness (under Syrian tutelage) to invite 
Hizballah into the political realm-although internal changes and events 
in Iran similarly played a part. The reasons behind Hizballah's decision to 
play a full part in the new political system, and the effect of Hizballah's 
entry into that system are of such importance that they will be discussed in 
detail below. 
Factors Facilitating Hizballah's Political Incorporation 
Incorporation of the erstwhile rejectionist Hizballah into the Lebanese 
political system was made possible by a number of developments. One fac- 
tor was the transformation Hizballah was already undergoing as a result of 
both internal and external dynamics. The end of the Iran-Iraq war, spelling 
the end to the dream that the Islamic revolution would spread through 
Iraq to the Levant, and the death of Khomeini-and the subsequent rise 
of a less dogmatic elite in Iran-made it possible for internal debates and 
tensions to come to the surface. The routinization that any revolutionary 
movement undergoes and the expansion of Hizballah's welfare network 
had already encouraged the emergence of a more pragmatic trend. The 
expansion of charitable efforts had begun to change the composition of 
Hizballah's supporters and the very effort of setting up charities in cooper- 
ation with local communities had begun to have a moderating effect. 
By the late 1980s the more fervent among Hizballah's supporters had 
begun to realize that Iran's brand of revolutionary Islam did not necessarily 
translate to Lebanon with its intensely multisectarian, pluralistic environ- 
ment. Hizballah, moreover, lacked the power to enforce its vision without 
consent once the central state reemerged. During the civil war, when Hiz- 
ballah had imposed its brand of puritanical Islam in the areas where it was 
dominant, it had alienated large sections of society. Within the enclaves, 
Hizballah had sufficient military muscle to weather local alienation, but 
when the civil war came to an end and the enclaves began to be reincorpo- 
rated into the central state, Hizballah's control became increasingly condi- 
tional upon gaining popular support-just as all erstwhile militias were 
now forced to learn to resolve their differences without resorting to arms. 
The pragmatic among Hizballah's leaders realized that both the resis- 
tance project and the dream of reshaping society according to Islamic prin- 
ciples would become untenable unless Hizballah adapted itself to the 
multiconfessional state that was likely to reemerge out of the civil war. In 
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the new political climate, a dogmatically Islamist resistance would not carry 
the support of the national government of Lebanon, potentially pitting 
Hizballah against both the Israelis and the Lebanese army. In a unified 
Lebanon, moreover, the prospects for establishing an Islamic state would 
be remote, particularly now that the expansion of the Iranian Islamic revo- 
lution had stalled. It was far from clear whether the secular regime in 
Damascus would be willing to back a dogmatically Islamist resistance at the 
cost of losing influence with other pro-Syrian parties in Lebanon. Willing- 
ness to compromise made political sense. A similar conclusion was reached 
by the pragmatic members of the government in Tehran who threw their 
weight behind the pragmatists within Hizballah. 211 
The 1989 restructuring of Hizballah's command structure, which sought 
more local accountability and less revolutionary "aloofness, " was a reflec- 
tion of these internal and external changes, as was the (electoral) ousting 
of Hizballah's hard-line secretary general Subhi al-Tufavli in favor of the 
more pragmatic Abbas al-Musawi in 1991. Musawi began the process of pre- 
paring Hizballah for entry into the political system in earnest-a move 
opposed by the Tufavli camp on the grounds that participation would legit- 
imate the Lebanese state and compromise the Islamic state ideal. When 
Musawi was killed by an Israeli air strike in 1992, a candidate with an 
equally pragmatic disposition, Saved Hassan Nasrallah, was elected, sug- 
gesting that the pragmatists had won out over the dogmatists. Supporting 
this conclusion is the fact that the election boycott Tufavli and his followers 
organized fell spectacularly flat. _na 
Hizballah's entry into the political system was eased by the movement's 
increasing, though far from uniform or complete, commitment to consul- 
tative politics. '; " Parallel to the structural reforms of the late 1980s, Hizbal- 
lah's political culture appears to have undergone a subtle change, away 
from a rigid centralism centered on the will of Khomeini, to a more consul- 
tative style of decision-making, still hierarchical but more responsive to the 
views of both a larger section of leaders and Hizballah's support base. Con- 
sultation with members and supporters in the process of policy formation 
has increased-as illustrated by the survey carried out to aid the leadership 
in deciding on whom to field as candidates for the 2000 national elec- 
tions'; '-although consultations tend to follow a top-down rather than a 
bottom-up pattern and decisions are still taken centrally and without much 
transparency. '; ' 
The consultative approach took an institutional form in 1991 when the 
part- resolved to encourage "the formation of residential and professional 
groups in each quarter of the southern suburbs, " to gather local informa- 
tion, and facilitate the process of advocacy. 'i The institution of a triannual 
party conclave gathering together all members above the rank of district 
representative to elect those who will govern the party for the next three 
years was another manifestation of this shift. 34 Ideologically, this approach 
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is supported by the Qur'anic command to consult. "'' It is tempered, how- 
ever, by the hierarchical nature of the clerical structure in Shi'i Islam. 
A number of structural factors have facilitated Hizballah's shift toward 
consultation although none are determinant. in and of themselves. One has 
been the expansion of Hizballah from a pure militia into the civic realm, 
introducing an operational logic that favors consultation for instrumental 
reasons. A charity is likely to be more effective-both in fundraising and in 
gaining grassroots cooperation-if it responds to the needs of its clientele. 
Another factor is Hizballah's position in the political system. As an outsider 
to the elite pact between the leading Maronite and Sunni players and 
Amal, and without a formal military to back up its claims to power, Hizbal- 
lah must derive power from other sources and has turned to popular legiti- 
macy to boost its political standing. It pays to canvass constituents' opinions 
regarding who to field for upcoming elections, so as to heed constituents' 
views if one wishes to retain their vote. That Amal portrays itself as a non- 
ideological party deriving its power primarily from traditional patron-client 
networks-often associated with corruption and nepotism-provides Hiz- 
ballah with a ready-made "identity niche" for gaining popular legitimacy 
as Amal's supposed opposite: an ideologically motivated, incorruptible, 
meritocratic and more egalitarian party. The Qur'anic emphasis on consul- 
tation, equality and integrity offers a ready ideological framework. The 
need to distinguish itself from Amal provides an incentive to activate this 
framework-however incompletely. 
This logic has been reinforced by the origins and composition of Hizbal- 
lah's leadership. From its inception, none of Hizballah's leaders have been 
of particularly high standing in their religion's clerical hierarchy. The only 
person with such a profile, Sayyed Fadlallah, was never part of the day-to- 
day running of the movement and sought to stay aloof from party politics. 
The absence of a dominant, hierarchical figure facilitated the emergence 
of a more egalitarian and consultative style of decision-making-although 
this process was tempered by the need for "military" obedience, secrecy 
and the clerically inspired disposition toward hierarchy. The increasing 
heterogeneity of Hizballah's leadership has similarly encouraged a shift 
toward consultation by increasing the need to maintain party unity across 
differences. 
The socioeconomic profile of Hizballah's constituency has reinforced 
this path. The majority of Hizballah's members come not from the tradi- 
tional elite families, but from lower- to lower-middle-class backgrounds, 
and increasing numbers of these are university graduates or people with 
professional aspirations-particularly since the end of the civil war. "' These 
qualities make Hizballah a typical counter-elite movement, outsiders with 
aspirations for power. For such a movement, the experience of exclusion 
may render the notion of organizational inclusiveness, and with it consulta- 
tive practices, attractive. Particularly if those in power practice a more auto- 
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cratic form of politics, consultative practices become a favorable option, 
not just for instrumental but also for constitutive reasons, which make the 
idea of "consultation" a core element of the movement's identity-if not 
always its practice. 
A final factor encouraging consultative politics has been the effect of the 
end of the civil war on Hizballah's relationship with its constituency. Dur- 
ing the 1980s, a level of popular support was necessary for securing logisti- 
cal assistance and hiding places. But in the general climate of war, not only 
had political activity become largely insignificant but also dissent was diffi- 
cult to express. Ensuring high levels of popular support was thus unneces- 
sary. With the reintroduction of a functioning central authority and regular 
elections, the calculus of popular support changed. In this new political 
environment, dissent could be expressed through a change in voting 
behavior. Silencing dissent became more difficult, not only because central 
authority had been restored but also because criticizing the resistance had 
become more acceptable for those not under occupation. At the same 
time, winning over new supporters became easier, as the arena of political 
contestation widened from the civil war enclaves to the entire liberated 
part of the country and as people began to feel more at ease with changing 
political persuasion. Consulting constituents was one way to gain support. 
Internal changes aside, Hizballah's entry into the political system would 
have been impossible but for four further enabling factors. The constitu- 
tional changes agreed upon in the Ta'if Agreement of 1989, which signaled 
the beginning of the end of the civil war, facilitated Hizballah's incorpora- 
tion. Under this agreement, hammered out under Syrian patronage by the 
existing elites (and thus excluding Hizballah), the ratio of Christian to 
Muslim in government was partially readjusted to reflect demographical 
changes and the office of Speaker, allocated to the Shi'a, was given more 
weight-thus beginning to address Shi'i grievances. The agreement also 
reiterated the original constitution's commitment to ending political sec- 
tarianism. =; 7 Because the Shi'a generally regard political sectarianism as one 
of the causes of their marginalization-though the Shi'a are the largest 
minority in Lebanon, comprising some 40 percent of the population, the 
division of power is still skewed in favor of the Christians and the Sunnis- 
the reiteration of this commitment offered Hizballah the opportunity to 
make this its central goal rather than its earlier, unconstitutional goal of 
working toward an Islamic state. 
Second, the Syrian regime, the unofficial hegemon in Lebanon until 
recently, needed a Shi'i opposition party in parliament to keep its, at times, 
truant ally Amal in check. Hizballah was the ideal candidate if it could be 
persuaded to tone down its Islamist goals. The fact that Syria and Iran had 
been close allies throughout the Iran-Iraq war and shared an aversion to 
Israel facilitated Syria's task of persuading Hizballah to accept the new situ- 
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ation-even if this meant political compromise and accepting closer Syrian 
control over the resistance. '; " 
The third enabling factor was the fact that neither the Lebanese constitu- 
tion and electoral laws nor Hizballah's own "constitution" prohibited the 
participation of Islamist clergy in the electoral system. Though Lebanon's 
constitution was modeled on the French constitution, the French state's 
unbendingly secular dogmatism was not adopted. Instead, building on 
Ottoman practices, the Lebanese state recognized the political role clergy 
had historically played in their communities and allowed them to run for 
political office. This flexibility allowed an Islamist party such as Hizballah, 
which, at least in principle, rejects the separation of religion and politics, 
to enter Lebanese politics and field clerical candidates. Hizballah's "consti- 
tution, " meanwhile, established from the start that participation in elec- 
tions was an Islamically legitimate way to conduct politics.; " The fact that 
Hizballah's goals included more than simply conducting an "Islamic resis- 
tance" and establishing an Islamic state, and could be restated in terms of 
a program f<br social justice, Shi'i emancipation, and continued national 
resistance facilitated the process of compromise for Hizballah's leadership. 
Finally, the Lebanese state had a vested interest in binding Hizballah to 
its fate. Syria, of course, demanded that the Lebanese government wel- 
come Hizballah into its system. But, Syrian interests aside, the government 
had two further reasons to coopt Hizballah. Its initially fierce opposition to 
both the very basis of the Lebanese state, and the way Lebanon was ruled 
by its elites, made the party a potential threat to the status quo. Cooption, 
it was hoped, would curb Hizballah's more radical impulses and induce it 
into accepting the multisectarian basis of the state. 4 At the same time, the 
Lebanese state needed a proxy resistance force that could exert pressure 
on Israel to withdraw, independently from the Lebanese state, thus making 
Israeli retaliatory actions against the state more problematic. 
Effect of Hizballah's Incorporation 
Hizballah's entry into the political system has had two significant conse- 
quences. Incorporation entailed a commitment to refrain from violence 
against domestic rivals and submitting to the official mediation organs of 
the state-despite Hizballah being the only remaining armed militia in 
postwar Lebanon. Since 1992, Hizballah has by and large refrained from 
using violence to settle disputes with other parties, in sharp contrast to the 
intra-sectarian infighting of the 1980s between Amal, the Communist Party 
and Hizballah. When clashes do erupt between Hizhallah and Amal, as they 
did in March 1993, Hizballah typically cooperates with the authorities in 
bringing the culprits to justice. " Similarly, when the Lebanese army killed 
16 pro-Hizhallah demonstrators in September 1993, the party refrained 
from using arms to seek revenge. 4 Though Hizballah's submission to state 
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authority is in part a function of the military imbalance between its forces 
and the Lebanese and, until recently, Syrian armies, cooperation would 
arguably not have been as extensive without the added disincentive of elec- 
toral losses. 
Hizballah's turn to politics also profoundly affected the composition of 
its constituency. During the 1980s, members and supporters of the organi- 
zation were predominantly religiously minded, and ideologically commit- 
ted to the notion of wilayal al fagih-although even then some were more 
interested in defending Lebanon and improving the lot of the Lebanese 
Shia. Though tensions existed from the start-as illustrated by the 1989 
debate between "hard-liners" and "moderates" following the death of 
Khomeini-the movement was relatively homogeneous. 
The 1990s saw the introduction of a new type of supporter. Once Hizbal- 
lah's reputation as an efficient party of principle grew, nonpracticing or 
nominally religious Shia began to turn to Hizballah. Secular-minded busi- 
nessmen became interested in Hizballah's anticorruption drive. Scions of 
old elite families realized that an alliance with this new party might prove 
advantageous. 4 Those benefiting from Hizballah's services, particularly if 
Amal had let them down previously, began to vote for Hizballah, as did 
those who were critical of the corrupt status quo or the lack of political will 
among the elites to confront the continuing Israeli occupation in the 
south. At the same time, an increasing number of Hizballah members were 
educated at secular institutions and pursued secular, as opposed to clerical, 
careers, resulting in a more heterogeneous membership profile. 44 
Once the Hizballah leadership realized that it had succeeded in attract- 
ing this ideologically heterogeneous constituency, it sought to both pre- 
serve and expand its influence among these "swing voters" in a process 
which social movement theorists call "frame alignment. "4", This process was 
encouraged by the Lebanese electoral system, which rewards cross-sectarian, 
cross-ideological alliances and penalizes sectarian or ideological isolation. ''' 
Those parties that succeed in building an electoral list that is supported by 
candidates from all the relevant sectarian backgrounds tend to do better in 
the elections. The need to woo non-Shi'i electoral allies encourages frame 
adaptation, reinforcing the incentives for adaptation emanating from the 
increase in Hizballah's internal heterogeneity and its attempts at expand- 
ing its constituency. 
One of the concrete results of this "frame alignment" has been the drop- 
ping of the call for an Islamic state in favor of an emphasis on humanitar- 
ian values derived from Islam, enabling nominal Shia and, to a lesser 
extent, people of other religions to subscribe to Hizballah's vision. The 
shift away from a focus on Iran and the Islamic revolution to a recognition 
of the legitimacy of Lebanon and a focus on building coalitions with Leba- 
non's Christians and other Lebanese parties is similarly an outcome of this 
process, as is Hizballah's increased focus on social justice and its use of a 
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purely secular language in parliament. 47 Though Islam is important to 
many of Hizballah's supporters, whether Hizballah strengthens Islam's 
hold over the public realm is of less significance to others than whether 
Hizballah tackles corruption and nepotism. The fact that, in a 1993 student 
survey, 70 percent of those who described themselves as having a low or 
medium level of religiosity supported Hizballah only serves to underline 
this observation. 4 It is therefore no surprise that Hizballah's insistence on 
the hijab or on working toward an Islamic state has lessened over the 
years. 49 
Hizballah's ability to carry out resistance operations against Israel has 
also been affected. Many of those voting for Hizballah representatives 
voted for them because of their reputation for good governance. Though 
the issue of continued resistance looms large in the mind of Hizballah's 
leaders, it does not necessarily loom as large in the consciousness of the 
general electorate-particularly since the withdrawal of the IDF in 2000. 
Whether or not Hizballah steps up its resistance activities is of potentially 
less relevance to them than whether Hizballah representatives will improve 
basic services-despite Hizballah's concerted efforts at creating a "society 
of the resistance" or resistance culture. -"' This is particularly pertinent to 
those with either a medium or a low socioeconomic status-for the former 
because they have much to lose in retaliatory strikes, for the latter because 
economic stability is vital for their very survival. Given the preponderance 
of both these categories among Hizballah supporters, Hizballah must pay 
close attention to the views prevalent among these categories to retain their 
support. 
Before the IDF's withdrawal, a certain level of material damage and loss 
of life was acceptable to a sizable section of'Shi`a, and Lebanese generally, 
even outside the occupation zone. The continued existence of a collective 
memory of suffering, the many links binding Shia across the line of demar- 
cation, national pride, and the fact that Hizballah poured significant 
amounts of money into local welfare, all served to bolster support for the 
resistance. Even Christians who were often more concerned about the pres- 
ence of Syrian troops than about the occupation of the south could give 
qualified support because the continued presence of Syrian troops was 
linked, in their minds, to the continued presence of Israeli troops in the 
south. However, qualified support for the resistance was unlikely to survive 
a protracted Israeli offensive in areas where a postwar "normality" had 
returned (unless Israel could be unambiguously blamed). 
The changed dynamic between Hizballah and its electoral constituencies 
meant that the party increasingly had to weigh up the costs of its resistance 
activities to the electorate. Its willingness to agree to the tacit establishment 
of rules of engagement with the IDF can in part be explained by this 
change in dynamic. The agreement, negotiated verbally in 1993 in the 
wake of Israel's Operation Accountability and reaffirmed in writing (on the 
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part of Israel) in 1996 following Operation Grapes of Wrath, '' stipulated 
that the conflict be confined to combatants and spare civilians. Given that, 
over the course of the conflict, Hizballah has killed only a handful of Israeli 
civilians in rocket attacks on northern Israel, against Israel's killing hun- 
dreds of Lebanese civilians, the agreement-if adhered to-was in Hizbal- 
lah's favor in limiting the costs to the general population. The seriousness 
with which Hizballah took its commitment to avoid unnecessary escalation 
can be gleaned from the fact that between 1993 and 1996 its resistance 
wing reportedly breached the agreement on only 13 occasions-against 
Israel's 231 -violations. 52 Hizballah's commitment to limit the cost to the 
civilian population did not prevent it from breaching the agreement in 
retaliation to what it saw as clear provocations-even if this provoked an 
escalation as it did with Operation Grapes of Wrath. However, it was typi- 
cally careful to breach the agreement only when unambiguously provoked 
so that it could lay the blame for any escalation on the IDF. 
Another outcome of this changed dynamic was an increase in the politi- 
cal will to end the hostage crisis. Though the extent of Hizballah's involve- 
ment in the hostage crisis is disputed, '' it was unquestionably in a position 
to exert pressure on the hostage-takers, as the latter operated in Hizballah- 
controlled areas and often had familial links with party members. A num- 
ber of external factors played a role in bringing the crisis to an end, includ- 
ing changes in the Iranian leadership, and in the position of Syria vis-ä- 
vis the United States. Indeed, according to one analyst, Hizballah used its 
leverage over the hostage-takers to boost its post-conflict position in negoti- 
ations with Syria, which needed to secure the hostages' release to cement 
its newfound proximity to the Western alliance of the 1991 Gulf War. . 7,4 But 
the prospect of haying to present itself to the electorate as a political party 
dedicated to social justice and reform was another factor encouraging Hiz- 
ballah to end the hostage crisis. " 
Since the IDF withdrawal in 2000, the level of popular tolerance for 
Israeli retaliatory action has dropped markedly. In response, Hizballah has 
limited its actions largely to the Shebaa Farms area. It has cooperated with 
the Lebanese Army in preventing Palestinian groups from attacking 
Israel. `'' It has stuck closely to the established rules of engagement (at least 
concerning the Lebanese-Israeli border) and has calibrated its attacks so 
as not to provoke large-scale retaliations. '- When a Hizballah leader was 
assassinated in Beirut, Hizballah's response was markedly muted. `, " Only 
once did hostilities escalate to pre-withdrawal levels of intensity - 
intriguingly not in retaliation for Israeli actions in Lebanon but in response 
to the IDF's March 2002 invasion of Palestinian towns and refugee camps 
in the West Bank. Even then Hizballah was careful not to escalate the hostil- 
ities beyond a localized border conflict. Syrian and Iranian pressure played 




tentatively supported by the fact that Hizballah began deescalating hostilit- 
ies before the Iranian Foreign Minister's above-mentioned intervention. '`' 
Hizballah has also begun to reinterpret the concept of resistance, subtly 
shifting the emphasis from military to social action. The annual "military 
reserve" training each Hizballah member must undergo appears to have 
become a vehicle for building esprit de corps and corporate identity as well 
as an attempt at keeping Hizballah's political and administrative personnel 
in military shape. The annual report of jihad al-Binaa, Hizballah's con- 
struction company set up originally to repair the structural damage result- 
ing from Israeli offensives, refers to farmers as "the well of resistance" and 
says the charity seeks to "boost the resistance of farmers ... through guid- 
ance orientation and agricultural rehabilitation. " Its focus, moreover, is 
overwhelmingly on building for the future, and a peaceful one at that. 6' 
Thus, even while maintaining a "resistance culture, " Hizballah seems to be 
engaged in a process of redefining what "resistance" entails-although the 
continuing crisis in Israel/Palestine and the ongoing violence in Iraq has 
provided Hizballah with ample opportunity to revert to the original mean- 
ing of "resistance. " 
Partly because of the ongoing conflict in Israel/Palestine, partly as a 
result of the war in Iraq, there still appears to be sufficient popular support 
for maintaining a military wing-as long as it is not seen as provoking 
"unavoidable" Israeli retaliations. Active opposition to Hizballah's right to 
bear arms is typically confined to Lebanon's non-Shi'i communities and 
has not seriously affected Hizballah's electoral chances among the 
Shia-as Hizballah's gains in the 2004 municipal and 2005 national elec- 
tions unambiguously show. Continuation of the resistance, moreover, has 
given Hizballah tangible benefits as it can capitalize on its status as the only 
Arab force to have successfully repelled the IDF. It has permitted Hizballah 
to maintain a high profile regionally and expand its influence inside the 
neighboring Palestinian territories, as the "godfather" of resistance against 
Israel. As long as Hizballah succeeds in limiting Israel's response, continu- 
ing its resistance efforts and rhetoric will only serve to remind its constitu- 
encies of' Hizballah's victory over the IDF and so strengthen Hizballah's 
political appeal. 
Effect of Israeli Policies 
One factor that has been pivotal in both the establishment of Hizballah 
and its subsequent popularity has been Israel's behavior. Hizballah's elec- 
toral gains cannot be understood without considering the impact of Israel's 
various offensives. To understand what impact Israel's actions have had on 
Hizballah, and why, more specifically, Israel's policies have not only failed 
to eradicate the movement but contributed to strengthening it, I will 
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briefly explore the rationale behind Israel's policies and the response they 
provoked. 
Israel's goal was the eradication of Hizballah's military capacities 
through the destruction of its military infrastructure. Because Hizhallah 
operated as a small-scale guerrilla force, its infrastructure was typically well 
hidden among the general population, confronting Israel with the 
dilemma of either limiting itself to acting reactively to guerrilla attacks to 
avoid civilian casualties or taking the battle to the guerrillas and incurring 
civilian casualties. The IDF decision to opt for the latter was in part moti- 
vated by the calculation that the general population would turn against 
Hizballah. Such an approach was inspired by the notion of "collective pun- 
ishment" which Israel had deployed in various guises throughout its con- 
flict with the Palestinians and which was based on the premise that the 
general population could not sustain the costs of a protracted offensive. '" 
Israel's two major offensives in 1993 and 1996 were premised on the notion 
that the material destruction and mass displacement of civilians would 
alienate the population and force the Lebanese government to act deci- 
sively against Hizhallah. The three minor offensives carried out between 
1999 and 2000 in the lead-up to Israel's withdrawal were inspired by similar 
notions. ` 
One of the reasons the IDF adopted this policy was the success of the 
1982 invasion in turning the general population against the PLO, destroy- 
ing the PLO's infrastructure in South Lebanon and ousting the PLO from 
Lebanon. " " What this comparison overlooks, however, is not only the fact 
that, far from eradicating resistance against Israel, the invasion triggered a 
new resistance force, but also that this resistance thrived every time the IDF 
attempted to eradicate it. Operation Grapes of Wrath illustrates this proc- 
ess well. It was launched in 1996 to destroy Hizballah's camps. arms caches, 
and rocket launching facilities. but not a single rocket launcher was 
destroyed and only 13 Hizhallah fighters were killed in the fighting. 
Instead, the bombing killed at least 16,5 civilians, including 109 refugees 
sheltering inside the UN compound at Qana, while thousands of civilians 
were forced to flee to the capital. '" Rather than weakening Hizhallah, the 
offensive caused Christians who had previously been ambivalent about the 
resistance effort to donate money and encouraged Christians, Muslims, 
and politicians not previously supportive of Hizballah to join demonstra- 
tions against the occupation and help raise funds for the resistance. "' 
There are various reasons for the failure of the IDF's policy of collective 
punishment to eradicate Hizballah. Unlike the PLO, Hizballah could not 
be isolated from its support base. Despite the limited appeal of Hizballah's 
Iranian associations and ideology, its resistance aims resonated strongly 
with the general population, and its leaders were well connected to their 
local communities. Hizballah's investments in local welfare and, post-1992 
its commitment to championing the interests of its electoral constituencies 
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ensured that Hizballah had enough popular credit to survive Israeli offen- 
sives. 
S\Tia also played an important part in ensuring that the Lebanese gov- 
ernment continued to back Hizballah, sometimes against its will. Israel 
believed, correctly, that there was a fundamental tension between Hizbal- 
lah's resistance goals-liberation at any cost-and the Lebanese govern- 
ment's interests-economic recovery and the reassertion of sovereignty. 
However, it underestimated Syria's control over the Lebanese government 
and Hizballah's willingness to accept the state's sovereignty in all areas but 
resistance, thus allowing the government to save face. "" 
A third reason was the fact that Israeli offensives were typically dispropor- 
tionate to Hizballah's initial resistance acts. Both the 1993 and 1996 offen- 
sives which killed around 150 each and displaced thousands were launched 
in response to Hizballah firing rockets into northern Israel, killing two peo- 
ple in 1993 and none in 1996.67 In each case, the rockets had been Hizbal- 
lah's response to Israeli attacks involving civilians outside the occupation 
zone-a breach of the rules of engagement agreement. Because the dis- 
crepancy between the initial act and the final response was so glaring, Hiz- 
ballah had little difficulty in persuading the Lebanese public that fault for 
their suffering lay with the IDF. 
A fourth reason was the high ratio of civilian to combatant casualties. 
The initial war of 1982-1985 left an estimated 19,000 dead, the majority 
civilians. The 1993 and 1996 offensives killed some 300 civilians between 
them, while each of the 231 recorded Israeli breaches of the rules of 
engagement between 1993 and 1996 typically resulted in civilian deaths. In 
most instances, few guerrilla fighters were killed. The high ratio of civilians 
to combatants killed was in part because of the nature of the conflict-a 
popular resistance movement against aerial bombardments. However, it 
was also a direct outcome of Israel's policy of collective punishment and its 
active pursuit of increasing the cost of conflict to the general population. 
Rather than isolating Hizballah, this policy led to an increase in general 
hatred of Israel and rendered Hizballah's rhetoric more resonant with the 
electorate. 
A fifth factor was the belief that Israel lacked the political will to eradi- 
cate Hizballah. From the start, Israeli public opinion was divided regarding 
the right course of action in Lebanon. The IDF's phased withdrawal to the 
south in 1983-1985 was in part due to the unexpectedly bloody counterof- 
fensive of the local Shia, in part due to contradictory views within succes- 
sive Israeli governments (which in turn fueled the Shi'i offensive)! Having 
been forced to withdraw once, the IDF, and the Israeli public, were loath 
to reoccupy Lebanon beyond the southern buffer zone-limiting the IDF's 
options to aerial bombardments and covert infiltrations. This, and the fact 
that the occupation force only numbered 1,500 soldiers, reinforced the 
notion that Israel lacked the political will to eradicate Hizballah. Israel's 
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vacillation between major offensives and containment, and its willingness 
to agree to a set of rules of engagement, sent out a similar message-as did 
the increasing level of domestic protests. Hizballah played on these domes- 
tic differences and was strengthened by them in its resolve to resist. 
A further factor was Israel's willingness to negotiate with the Lebanese 
government. Though the negotiations were ostensibly between two sover- 
eign states, they revolved around ending hostilities between Hizballah and 
the IDF, effectively giving Hizballah an indirect presence at the negotiating 
table. Since Hizballah was juggling local, Syrian, and Iranian interests, it 
had limited room to maneuver and could not fully exploit its advantage. 
Nonetheless the organization's political profile was boosted and the notion 
that Israel lacked political stamina was reinforced. The various negotiations 
Israel has entered into via third parties over the release of hostages and 
soldiers' bodies have had similar results! `' 
That Israel was willing to negotiate and agree to a set of rules of engage- 
ment was partly because of the attainment of a limited balance of power 
between Hizballah and the IDF-or what one Hizballah leader called a 
"balance of horror. " 7" Within the occupation zone, and following a typical 
pattern of protracted conflict between unequal forces, Hizballah had suc- 
ceeded in reducing the casualty ratio from 10: 1 to between 1: 2.7 and 1: 1 
by the late 1990S. 7 I Because Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon was 
increasingly contested domestically, the rising number of Israeli casualties 
hurt the Israeli government particularly hard while boosting the resist- 
ance's morale. By the late 1990s, Hizballah had also perfected the art of 
psychological warfare. It filmed successful assaults and broadcast them in 
Hebrew into Israel via its satellite station, al-Manar. It carried out a number 
of targeted assassinations against high-ranking Israeli officers and their 
Lebanese allies, and ambushed a covert IDF operation on Lebanese terri- 
tory, showing that it had managed to infiltrate Israeli intelligence. 72T6 sol- 
diers who were already ambivalent about their presence in Lebanon, this 
type of psychological offensive was deeply demoralizing. 
Outside the occupation zone, Hizballah attempted to provide a deter- 
rent to Israel's aerial bombardments by expanding its arsenal of surface-to- 
surface rockets. Though the damage caused was typically material rather 
than involving human casualties, the terror factor was of some importance 
in restraining Israeli offensives . 7" Both the 1993 and 1996 offensives culmi- 
nated in negotiations aimed at persuading Hizballah to stop firing rockets 
into northern Israel while the absence of any major Israeli offensive since 
1996 can in part be ascribed to an increase in Hizballah's rocket arsenal, 
now rumored to stand at 7,500-10,000. Hizballah's ability to neutralize an 
Israeli listening post on the Golan Heights in retaliation for the IDF's tar- 
geting Syrian installations inside Lebanon was another instance of this new 
balance of power. 74 
Of particular significance was the belief among Israeli intelligence ana- 
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lusts that Hizballah had acquired rockets with a range of 120 miles, which, 
if true, would have increased Hizballah's firing range tenfold-bringing 
major Israeli cities such as Haifa within range. It is disputable whether Hiz- 
ballah has acquired control over such rockets, or whether these rockets 
would be effective in causing serious harm given their lack of controllabil- 
ity. But the fact that it is possible that Hizballah might hit Israeli cities 
means that the IDF must take into account that an offensive might be met 
with an extended counteroffensive. The fact that Sharon, rumored to have 
considered using the Iraq war to deal Hizballah a decisive blow, did not 
carry out any such plans is a possible illustration of this new reality. 7ý 
Finally, although collective punishment has been counterproductive as 
a means of eradicating Hizballah, it has arguably been one of the factors 
deterring Hizballah from escalating the conflict. However, it would not 
have been as effective in doing so if Hizballah had not become partially 
dependent on maintaining popular support by having entered the political 
system. Furthermore, if the policy of collective punishment had not been 
adopted and Israel had withdrawn earlier, it is debatable whether Israel 
would have needed such a policy in the first place to deter Hizballah, as 
the organization's support base would arguably have been significantly less 
militant. 
Israel's attempts at negotiating an end to its two major offensives of the 
1990s would also have been less successful if Hizballah had not become 
part of the political system in Lebanon. Because Hizballah had a vested 
interest in the system, the Lebanese government had leverage over Hizbal- 
lah, however limited, which it would have otherwise lacked. Moreover, 
because Hizballah's relationship with its supporters was now regulated by 
an electoral dynamic, Hizballah had an increased incentive to prevent the 
conflict with Israel from turning into a protracted war, thus making it more 
agreeable to accept a negotiated mutual containment policy. 
Effects of 9/11 and the War on Terror 
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent "global war on terror" have 
affected Hizballah in various and conflicting ways. On the one hand, 9/11 
has renewed the West's fascination with the question of whether Hizballah 
is a terrorist organization. Allegations concerning Hizballah's alleged coop- 
eration with al-Qaeda abound, placing Hizballah in an internationally pre- 
carious position. It has responded to this accusation with typical self- 
confidence, mounting a series of operations against the IDF in the immedi- 
ate aftermath of 9/11 as if to underline that its leaders believed theirs to 
be a just cause carried out with legitimate means, and that they would do 
as they saw fit, regardless of the world's views. To date, besides the U. S. and 
Israel, only Canada among Western states has placed Hizballah in its 
entirety on its list of proscribed "terrorist organizations" (as opposed to 
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listing only Hizballah's so-called "External Organization") . 
The EU has so 
far refused to bow to U. S. pressure-allowing EU politicians and diplomats 
to keep channels of communication open with Hizballah. Because so few 
states have responded to pressure from the U. S. and Israel, and because 
Hizballah has been listed as a terrorist organization by the U. S. for some 
two decades already, the placing of Hizballah on the U. S. 's post-9/11 list 
has not had a significant impact. However, this situation could change if 
the EU-which has signed a Neighborhood Agreement with Syria and Leb- 
anon and is seriously involved in Lebanon's postwar reconstruction- 
succumbed to pressure to blacklist Hizballah. The fact that the European 
Parliament has already called on the EU to blacklist Hizballah in its entirety 
may be significant in this respect. 
The war on terror, and particularly the U. S. invasion of Iraq, has affected 
both Syria and Iran, which in turn has had an effect on Hizballah. Hizbal- 
lah's two main state sponsors are well aware of the fact that they are next on 
the list of potential targets of the U. S. administration. However, Hizballah is 
so integral to both their foreign policies that it would take more than the 
mere possibility of a threat to significantly affect their support. Develop- 
ments in Lebanon following the February 2005 assassination of former 
prime minister Rafiq Hariri and Syria's subsequent withdrawal may affect 
Syria's long-term commitment to Hizballah but so far Syrian support has 
remained unwavering. 
The war on terror has opened up new opportunities. Though Syria and 
Iran need to tread more carefully, both regimes appear determined to fully 
exploit the possibilities opened up by the U. S. difficulties in Iraq. Iran is 
well aware that the U. S. recognizes Iran's potential for undermining the 
U. S. efforts at rebuilding Iraq by stirring up the majority Shi'i population. 
Syria has a similarly pivotal kingmaker role through its influence over the 
Sunni minority and the remnants of the Ba'th party. The fact that Iran 
continues to refuse to bow to international pressure regarding its nuclear 
program suggests that the Iranian regime is, until now, not taking the 
threat of U. S. intervention seriously. The election of hard-liner Mahmood 
Ahmadinejad to the presidency is only likely to strengthen Iranian resolve. 
The Syrian regime is in a weaker situation because of the precariousness of 
President Bashar Assad's position. The fact that Syria has succumbed to 
international and local pressure to withdraw from Lebanon is indicative of 
this weakness. But Syria too has shown few signs of allowing this to affect 
its support for Hizballah-as evidenced by its decision to allow Hizballah 
to oppose Amal in the 2004 municipal elections, thereby sending the mes- 
sage that Hizballah is not only an organization with a grassroots mandate 
but also would be a much stronger force were it not for Syria's curbing 
hand. 77 
Hizballah itself has similarly been strengthened by the opportunities 
offered by the war in Iraq. The overwhelming presence of Hizballah flags 
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at various Shi'i demonstrations at the start of the occupation indicated how 
many Iraqi Shi'a look to Hizballah as the role model of a successful Shi'i 
political-cum-militia party. Little is known for certain concerning the 
extent of Hizballah's actual involvement in Iraq. In Lebanese terms, 
whether the organization is directly involved in Iraq is of relatively little 
direct relevance. What counts is the fact that Hizballah can increase its sup- 
port base by championing the downtrodden Shi'a of Iraq and rhetorically 
linking the latter's plight to the plight of the Palestinians and the plight of 
the Lebanese Shi'a before May 2000.; 1' The fact that Hizballah succeeded 
in attracting 250,000 people-or 1 in every 8 Lebanese-to declare their 
readiness to die as martyrs during a demonstration denouncing the U. S. 
invasion of Iraq, only vindicates this observation. 19 
The events of 9/11 have also served to reinforce the regional position 
Hizballah has gained as a result of its success in ousting the IDF from Leba- 
non and its subsequent role as the "godfather" of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 
Palestine. Before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hizballah was 
engaged in a heated debate about the future of the resistance, one wing 
arguing that Hizballah's future lay in politics, the other insisting that the 
struggle against Israel and Western hegemony should remain Hizballah's 
core task. " With the outbreak of the Intifada, the wind was taken out of 
the sails of the politically oriented wing. The U. S. response to 9/11 has 
made the position of this wing even more untenable, while offering the 
pro-resistance party unprecedented opportunities to capitalize on Hizbal- 
lah's regional standing as the only Arab force capable of repelling Israel 
(and by implication, U. S. forces in the region). 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
A number of tentative conclusions can be drawn. Hizballah's case suggests 
that incorporation into the electoral process can under certain circum- 
stances have a moderating effect on an insurgent group. The group in 
question must be sufficiently embedded and representative of a section of 
the population to envisage an electoral future for itself. Its leadership, deci- 
sion-making structures and ideology must be able to support the notion of 
compromise. If the leadership is responsive to popular opinion, and popu- 
lar opinion favors a moderate course, this facilitates both the process of 
incorporation and the process of moderation. Whether incorporation is 
likely to occur and lead to moderation is in part dependent on the compo- 
sition of the movement. In Hizballah's case, the increase in highly edu- 
cated and upwardly mobile supporters appears to be positively correlated 
to the movement's incorporation and relative shift toward moderation- 
despite the fact that recent research on political violence suggests that an 
increase in education and wealth is positively correlated to an increase in 
support for political violence. "' 
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Some democratization theorists, most famously Seymour Martin Lipset, 
have long argued that an increase in per capita income facilitates the proc- 
ess of democratization. If democratic peace theory has any validity, this 
means that an increase in per capita income is likely to lead to a reduction 
in support for violence. 82 The relationship between socioeconomic status, 
democratization, and support for violence is far more complex than these 
theories suggest. "; However, Hizballah's case still appears to indicate that, 
under conditions of electoral competition and a functioning political sys- 
tem in which the insurgent organization has a political stake, an increase 
in the overall socioeconomic condition of that organization's support base 
is positively correlated to moderation in the organization's conduct. 
A further necessary condition appears to be a sufficiently strong central 
government-or external force backing up the government-to enforce 
compliance. Of particular importance is the relative balance of power 
between the insurgents and the government. If either is too weak, there is 
little incentive for either party to compromise. Instead a level of stalemate 
is necessary. This conclusion is echoed by Dankwart Rustow's classic theory 
of democratic transition which stipulates that for democratization to occur 
a stalemate must exist between at least two contending forces, typically an 
elite and an emerging counter-elite. '; It is also echoed by Dietrich 
Rueschemever and colleagues' structural theory of democratization which 
contends that democratization is the product of the emergence of a "bal- 
ance of class power" between state and landed elites on the one hand, and 
a coalition of working and middle classes on the other. ", Hizballah is pre- 
cisely such a coalition and thus, if Rueschemeyer is correct, a "natural" 
force for democratization (regardless of its views on democratization). 
A second lesson lies in the observation that, in Hizballah's case, the pol- 
icy of collective punishment served to consolidate rather than eradicate the 
movement-echoing the findings of this book's chapters on Hamas (Chap- 
ter 4), the Kashmiri insurgents (Chapter 7), and the IRA (Chapter 6). In 
the cases of Hamas and Hizballah, the organizations in question are 
socially deeply embedded, and consequently reflect the socioeconomic 
composition as well as the aspirations of a significant section of society. In 
both instances, insurgent violence was preceded by state violence in the 
form of invasion and occupation, creating a shared set of grievances among 
the larger population. Under such conditions, collective punishment, with 
its twin characteristics of being disproportionate to the original offense (to 
deter future offenses) and targeting innocent bystanders, reinforces the 
original grievances and grants legitimacy to the insurgents' rhetoric and 
methods, playing into the insurgents' hand. While it may help to deter 
escalatory attacks, it appears to do this only if the insurgents incur a sig- 
nificant political cost from escalating the conflict-in Hizballah's case, by 
being part of the electoral system. The benefits of deterrence, though, do 
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not necessarily outweigh the costs of increased popular legitimacy for the 
insurgents, and increased popular support for militant practices. 
The level of an organization's embeddedness appears to play an im- 
portant determining role. The more embedded an insurgent movement, 
arguably the more difficult it is to eradicate it by military means alone- 
particularly if those means are limited to aerial bombardments and covert 
operations. If the state were prepared to use all coercive means at its dis- 
posal without regard for human rights, it might be able to suppress an 
insurgent organization through brute force alone, as President Assad of 
Syria did in 1982 in Hama, killing 10,000-30,000. For a democracy, total 
disregard for human rights is neither desirable nor electorally feasible. But 
even Assad's ruthless suppression was accompanied with socioeconomic 
and political strategies to weaken popular support for the insurgents and 
bind citizens to the state. "' 
When a movement is embedded, its aspirations are to a certain extent a 
reflection of the aspirations of a section of the population. Although an 
insurgent movement can manipulate its constituency's aspirations, it can 
only do so to a limited extent. Hizballah's particular evolution suggests that 
an embedded organization such as Hizballah must heed the views of its 
supporters if it is to retain its influence. The construction of grievances is 
a two-way process between the organization's ideologues and its support- 
ers-particularly so if the organization in question operates in a competi- 
tive electoral system where support can be both gained and lost, and 
competition is conducted by nonviolent means. If an organization such as 
Hizballah reflects, even to a limited extent, the genuine views of a signifi- 
cant section of the population, its goals and grievances cannot be ignored 
if an end to violence is desired. While it is impossible for Israel to meet 
Hizballah's demand that it dismantle itself, Israel can meet Hizballah's calls 
for its withdrawal from the disputed border areas, and for an end to viola- 
tions of Lebanese airspace. Such a response is likely to decrease popular 
support for radical solutions which will increase the pressure on Hizballah 
to adapt its rhetoric and practice if it is to maintain its popular backing. 
That such a move is unlikely to result in Hizballah increasing its 
demands (as those opposing accommodation might argue) can be inferred 
from the fact that Hizballah, despite its continuing call for the liberation 
of Jerusalem, has only laid claim to border areas whose legal status is ambig- 
uous. The Lebanese population are not interested in suffering for the liber- 
ation of Palestine, denying Hizballah the popular support needed to 
expand the conflict (although they may attempt to continue to covertly 
support Palestinian resistance groups). Once Israel has met Hizballah's 
demands concerning Lebanon, domestic and international pressure on 
Hizballah to rein in the resistance is likely to increase dramatically- 
especially if, in the absence of fear of Israeli reprisals, Lebanon's economy 
were to recover. If such a move were to be accompanied by a negotiated 
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settlement stipulating Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Syria's 
support for maintaining an autonomous resistance force would similarly 
weaken. Syria's withdrawal and the resurgence of a vocal antiresistance 
movement inside Lebanon has made such a scenario more likely-even 
though Hizballah's success in the 2005 national elections (winning 11 seats 
by itself and 35 in coalition with Amal) has enabled Hizballah to claim a 
popular mandate for continued resistance. The fact that Hizballah leaders 
have begun, for the first time, to express willingness to discuss the future 
of the resistance is a possible indicator of things to come. `' 
A third observation concerns the importance of not viewing Hizballah as 
a rigid, eternally hostile, unchangeable organization. Such an approach is 
inspired by both the "terrorism paradigm" that Western leaders too often 
adopt, and by the more essentialist writings on Islamism or political Islam. 
The evolution charted above suggests that an embedded organization like 
Hizballah can be responsive to external pressures and capable of change 
and compromise. Adoption of a paradigm that assumes ideological rigidity 
is likely to affect state policies negatively. In the case of Israel, the policy of 
collective punishment was arguably sustained by a view-derived from Isra- 
el's contemporary understanding of the PLO-that saw Hizballah as immu- 
table, bent on the total destruction of Israel and thus in need of 
eradication. Such a view ignores the fact that Hizballah needs a level of 
popular support to be successful and that popular support for eradicating 
Israel, if this incurs personal costs, is largely lacking. Conversely, adoption 
of a paradigm that acknowledges that Hizballah is an ideologically mutable 
organization facilitates a state response which seeks to understand the fac- 
tors shaping Hizballah's behavior and attempts to change these to trans- 
form the situation, and with it, the organization, into one that sustains 
peace, or at least a permanent ceasefire. Such an approach would focus 
among other things on ensuring a general increase in economic and edu- 
cational opportunities, and a political future for the moderates among the 
insurgents in question. 
Labeling an organization like Hizballah "terrorist" unnecessarily com- 
plicates reaching a resolution. As long as Hizballah is publicly discredited 
as a "terrorist organization, " Israel must resort to indirect and contorted 
negotiations that both limit the chances of a successful resolution and 
bestow the very legitimacy on Hizballah that Israel's policy of branding it 
as "terrorist" is seeking to avoid. Conversely, if Israel (and the U. S. ) were 
to drop its policy of labeling Hizballah "terrorist" and propose negotia- 
tions that included Hizballah, pressure on the latter to accept the invitation 
would increase dramatically and allow Israel to take the moral high 
ground. 
Finally, the case of Hizballah contains particularly compelling lessons for 
the case of Hamas. Hamas, like Hizballah, is a movement composed of an 
upwardly mobile counter-elite, an increasingly heterodox constituency, 
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with similar goals and a comparable position within the community's politi- 
cal hierarchy (though Palestine lacks Lebanon's multisectarianism). That 
Hamas's behavior has not become more moderate in response to its politi- 
cal inclusion in the Palestinian system is to a large extent a function of the 
fact that its inclusion was only partial; that until recently a political future 
for Hamas was not seriously envisaged by either the Palestinian Authority 
or the peace process's international sponsors; and that the general popula- 
tion had not experienced a significant peace dividend, either in economic 
terms or in personal security. As a result, and in particular because Hamas's 
post-conflict prospects are uncertain while public opinion has until 
recently supported the practice of suicide bombing, the incentive to 
become more accommodating has not been as great as has been the case 
with Hizballah. The case of Hizballah suggests that if Israel were to cease 
its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (and in particular its hated occu- 
pation practices) ; allow the Palestinian economy to grow; and encourage 
the Palestinian Authority to secure a post-conflict political future for 
Hamas, then Hamas might be socialized into becoming more moderate as 
a result of its constituency becoming more accommodating. 
Glossary 
al :, kqsa Intifada: Palestinian uprising of September 2000 until the present. 
Amal: Hizballah's chief rival among the Shi'i parties, established in the 1970s by 
Musa Sadr, subsequently led by Nabih Berri, and a partner to the ruling coalition 
since the 1980s. 
Bekaa Valley: Lebanon's furthermost valley to the east, bordering Syria and popu- 
lated largely by Shi'a; one of Hizballah's heartlands. 
Da'wa Party: transnational Shi'i Islamist movement calling for the establishment of 
an Islamic state, founded in Iraq but with a local branch in Lebanon 
Golan Heights: Syrian land bordering Lebanon, occupied by Israel during the Six 
Day War of 1967. 
Hizballah: literally "Party of God, " referring to a passage in the Qur'an which pre- 
dicts that the party of God will be victorious. 
hijab headscarf. 
IDF: Israeli Defense Forces. 
Islamism: the ideology of those seeking to establish an Islamic state and society 
based on Islamic law and principles. 
jihad al-Binaa: literally "reconstruction jihad (effort), " Hizballah's network of 
agricultural, construction and engineering services, initially established to repair 
structural damage caused by Israeli offensives. 
Levant: the area of the Middle East bordering on the Mediterranean, encompassing 
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan. 
Maronite: refers to the largest Christian denomination in Lebanon; the National 
Pact allocated the presidency to the Maronites. 
Movement of the Disinherited: Shi'i revival movement, established by Imam Musa 
Sadr in the 1970s to address the socioeconomic marginalization of Lebanon's 
Shia. 
Multinational Force: coalition of U. S., French and Italian forces initially dispatched 
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to Lebanon to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon; following the 
Sabra and Chatila massacres, the MNF returned and became embroiled in the 
Lebanese civil war. 
Operation Accountability: Jule 1993 Israeli air offensive aimed at curbing Hizbal- 
lah; more than 130 civilians were killed, 600 wounded, 200,000-300,000 dis- 
placed. 
Operation Grapes of Wrath: April 1996 Israeli air offensive aimed at curbing Hiz- 
ballah; 165 were killed (mostly civilians), 300-400 wounded, an estimated 
: 00,00( displaced. 
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization, umbrella organization of secular Palestin- 
ian nationalist movements. 
Shia (adjective: Shi'i): minority denomination within Islam, originating in the dis- 
pute over the Prophet's succession in the seventh century c. t:.; the Shia form 
the largest denomination in Lebanon; the National Pact granted them the post 
of House Speaker 
Sunni: the majority denomination within Islam; the Sunnis were allocated the Pre- 
miership by the National Pact 
wilayat al frgih: rule of the supreme jurisprudent (Ayatollah Khomeini's blueprint 
for an Islamic state in Iran) 
Timeline 
1920: France is granted mandate over Lebanon and Syria by League of Nations, 
following collapse of Ottoman Empire. 
1943: Lebanon is declared independent; National Pact establishes division of power 
between Maronites, Sunnis, and Shia. 
1959: Imam Musa Sadr arrives in Lebanon. 
1966: Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah arrives in Lebanon, which becomes a center 
for Shi'i activism. 
1970: PLO establishes headquarters in Lebanon, having been ousted from Jordan. 
1970s: Lebanese branch of (Iraqi) Da'wa Party is established by activists close to 
Fadlallah, following the steady expulsion of Lebanese clerical students from 
Najaf. Iraq. 
1974: Movement of the Disinherited is established by Imam Musa Sadr. 
1975: Civil war breaks out in Lebanon; Amal is established by Imam Musa Sadr. 
1978: Israel invades Lebanon to curb PLO; Imam Sadr disappears in Liby a. 
1979: Shah is toppled in Iran; Ayatollah Khomeini establishes the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, providing political inspiration for Lebanese Shia. 
1982: Israel invades Lebanon, forces PLO out to Tunisia, occupies southern Leba- 
non and Beirut; Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrive in Lebanon; foundations of 
Hizballah are established; Multinational Forces arrive; first suicide operation is 
carried out against IDF headquarters in Tyre. 
1983: Suicide operations are carried out against U. S. Embassy, U. S. Marines, and 
French paratroopers; first Western hostages are taken by activists close to Hizbal- 
lah; Multinational Forces leave. 
1984: Further suicide operations are conducted against IDF headquarters in Tyre 
and Sidon. 
1985: IDF completes withdrawal to self-declared "buffer zone" in the south; Hizbal- 
lah publishes its "Open Letter"; suicide operations gradually stop. 
1986: Hizballah establishes Mailis al-Shura (consultative council). 
1987: Subhi al-Tufayli emerges as Hizballah's first secretary-general. 
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1988: Height of Amal-Hizballah clashes; end of Iran-Iraq war marks end to dream 
of Iraq becoming second Islamic republic. 
1989: Ta'if Agreement signed by major Lebanese factions, signaling beginning of 
the end of the civil war; Hizballah initially condemns the agreement as an 
undemocratic elite pact; Ayatollah Khomeini, supreme head of the (Iranian) 
Islamic revolution to which Hizballah subscribes, dies; Hizballah undergoes 
restructuring. 
1991: Secretary-General Subhi al-Tufavli deselected in favor of more pragmatic 
Abbas al-Musawi; hostage crisis begins to come to an end. 
1992: Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi assassinated by the IDF; Hassan Nasrallah 
elected as Hizballah's third secretary-general; Israeli Embassy in Argentina 
bombed, killing 32, wounding 252, allegedly in retaliation for Musawi's assassina- 
tion (available evidence remains speculative, pointing if anything to Iran rather 
than Hizballah); final hostages released; Hizballah participates in the first post- 
war national elections and wins 8 out of 27 Shi'i seats (plus 4 allied seats out of a 
total of 128). 
1993: Israeli air offensive Operation Accountability kills over 130 civilians, wounds 
600, displaces 200,000-300,000; Hizhallah and Israel agree upon "rules of 
engagement. 
1994: Suicide car bomb kills 96, wounds 127 at the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Associa- 
tion headquarters in Argentina; Hizhallah blamed though available evidence 
remains speculative. 
1996: Israeli air offensive Operation Grapes of Wrath kills 165 (mostly civilians), 
wounds 300-400, displaces an estimated 500,000; Hizhallah wins 7 seats (plus 3 
allied seats) in national elections. 
1998: Hizballah participates successfully in first postwar municipal elections. 
2000: Israel withdraws from Lebanon leaving only a few disputed border areas; Hiz- 
ballah wins 9 seats (plus 2 allied seats) in national elections; outbreak of al-Agra 
Intifada in Palestine enables Hizballah to continue playing the resistance card. 
2002: Worst flare-up of'cross-border violence since 2000 erupts in response to the 
IDF invading Palestinian towns and refugee camps. 
2004: Hizhallah stages a 250,000-strong march protesting the invasion of Iraq. 
2005: Rafik al-Hariri, former Lebanese prime minister, assassinated; calls for Syrian 
withdrawal intensify, domestically and internationally; Hizhallah organizes a pro- 
Syria demonstration involving an estimated 400,000 demonstrators; Syrian forces 
withdraw; Hizballah wins 11 seats (plus 3 allied seats) in the national elections, 
Amal-Hizballah coalition wins 35 seats. 
